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SHOULD THERE BE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING FOR DRUG TESTING OF
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES?
The possibility of drug testing confronts most employees today.'
Drug testing is of major concern to athletes2 and private sector em-
ployees.' The nation's employers, encouraged by the government, seek
to halt drug abuse and save additional employment costs.4 Commenta-
tors cite four major reasons for implementing drug testing programs:
the increased health care costs to employers from employee drug
abuse;5 the legal risk intoxicated employees represent to employers; 6
1. See, e.g., The Enemy from Within, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 58; Should Employers
Be Able to Test for Drug Users, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1986, at B7, col. 1; Stille, Drug
Testing: The Scene Is Set for a Dramatic Legal Collision Between the Rights of Employ-
ees and Workers, National Law Journal, Apr. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Stille, Some Judges
"Say No" to Drug Tests, National Law Journal, Oct. 6, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
2. See, e.g., Testing Plan Is Disclosed, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1986, at B2, col. 6 (Base-
ball Commissioner Peter Ueberroth discloses plans for testing baseball players);
N. CA.A. Drug Ruling, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1986, at D28, col. 4 (drug testing program
adopted by the National Collegiate Athletic Association); NFL. Plans Random Drug
Tests: Players Face Risk of Suspension, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1986, at Al, col. 1 (N.F.L.
Commissioner Pete Rozelle announces new drug testing program).
3. Chapman, The Ruckus Over Medical Testing, FORTUNE, Aug. 19, 1985, at 57
(focuses on accuracy of drug testing); Waldholz, Drug Testing in the Workplace: Whose
Rights Take Precedence?, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 11, 1986, at 35, col. 3 (debate be-
tween an executive whose company utilizes drug testing and another executive whose
company does not use drug testing); Trost, For Firms That Do Test, The Pitfalls Are
Numerous, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 11, 1986, at 35, col. 3 (choosing the right type of
test).
4. See generally Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace:
Costs Controls and Controversies (1986) [hereinafter Workplace] (report surveying cur-
rent issues regarding drug and alcohol abuse, including legal developments and case
studies of employers utilizing some form of drug testing or survey system).
5. Lehr & Middlebrooks, Work-Place Privacy Issues and Employer Screening Poli-
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the internal and external security risks for the employer from employee
drug use;7 and the role of employees as an employer's public represen-
tative.' President Ronald Reagan included these reasons in a recent
Executive Order9 imposing mandatory drug testing on executive
branch workers1° employed in sensitive positions.1"
A. Drug Testing Unilaterally Ordered
Citing the erosion of public confidence,12 President Reagan's Execu-
tive Order encourages drug testing in public employment. 3 Under the
order, drug testing is permissible in the public sector if a reasonable
suspicion of drug use exists, during an accident investigation, or as a
follow-up to rehabilitation. 14 The Executive Order also requires agen-
cies to test new applicants for employment.15 Since the Executive Or-
der became effective immediately, employee unions could not bargain
over the implementation of the drug testing program or its
procedures. 16
cies, 11 EMPL. REL. L.J. 407 (1985) (evaluation of drug and alcohol testing and their
suggestions regarding testing programs).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Exec. Order No. 12564, Drug-Free Federal Workplace, 22 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1188 (Sept. 22, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Executive Order]. Moreover,
preceding the text of the Executive Order is the text of President and Mrs. Reagan's
September 14, 1986 address to the nation regarding the national campaign against drug
abuse. Their appeal to fight drug abuse extended not only to employers, but also to
unions, schools, professional athletes, and clergy. Address by President Reagan and
Mrs. Reagan, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRE. Doc. 1183, 1186 (Sept. 22, 1986).
10. Employees subject to the president's order include employees of executive fed-
eral agencies. The order excludes armed forces, employees of the United States Postal
Service, and executive employees in the legislative and judicial branches. Executive Or-
der, supra note 9, at 1191.
11. "Sensitive employees" include employees designated as such by agency head,
law enforcement officers, or presidential appointees. Id. at 1191-92. Also included are
employees with access to classified information, and employees in other positions desig-
nated by the agency head as sensitive because the position involves significant considera-
tions of trust and confidence. Id.
12. Id. at 1189.
13. Id. at 1190.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1192.
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DRUG TESTING OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
Federal union employees face mandatory drug testing. The Federal
Labor Relations Authority 7 (FLRA) is presently considering whether
federal agencies must negotiate with employee unions 8 regarding drug
testing proposals.' 9 Among other concerns,20 the FLRA believes that
bargaining over drug testing might excessively interfere with manage-
ment's employment rights.2' As part of its evaluation of the bargaining
17. The Federal Labor Relations Authority has three members, each appointed by
the President for a five year term subject to confirmation by the Senate. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7104(a), (b), (c) (1982). The FLRA's many duties include determination of appropri-
ate collective bargaining units, the staging of representation elections, and determina-
tion of management rights and needs for certain rules, bargaining issues and unfair
labor practice hearings. 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (2) (A)-(I) (1982).
18. The administrative body overseeing private sector labor relations is the NLRB.
The Board consists of five members, all appointed by the President for five year terms
and approved by the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). The Board also can determine
bargaining units, outcomes of representation elections and, most significantly, unfair
labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 159, 160 (1982).
19. FLRA Offers Opportunity to Comment in Drug Test Negotiability Cases, [July-
Dec.] Government Employee Rel. Rep. (BNA) Vol. 24, No. 1178, 1184 (Sept. 1, 1986)
[hereinafter Opportunity to Comment] (general request for amicus briefs).
20. Opportunity to Comment, supra note 19, at 1184. Other issues for consideration
include: (1) security sensitive positions and negotiability of drug testing; (2) negotiating
over drug test reliability; (3) whether drug testing is an exercise of management's right
to provide internal security; (4) negotiating over the consequences of positive test re-
sults; and (5) the effect of random drug testing on negotiability. Id.
21. Id. Management rights listed in 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a) (1982) are limited. The
prologue of subsection (a) states that management rights are "subject to subsection (b)
of this section." Subsection (b) states, among other things, that a labor organization is
free to negotiate "procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in
exercising any authority under this section," 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2) (1982), and "appro-
priate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any authority
under this section by such management officials." 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3) (1982). Pre-
sumably, under either the "procedures" or the "appropriate arrangements" exception, a
labor union would be able to tie the hands of management by forcing management to
negotiate drug testing proposals. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 2782
v. FLRA, 702 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (an "appropriate arrangement" proposed
under paragraph (b)(3) of § 7106 is not ipsofacto invalidated by conflicting with a spe-
cific management right in subsection (a), because the rights in (a) are "subject to" the
negotiating rights in (b)).
Specific management rights are:
(I) to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees, and inter-
nal security practices of the agency; and
(2) in accordance with applicable laws-
(A) to hire, assign, direct, lay off, and retain employees in the agency, or to sus-
pend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary action against such
employees;
1988)
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issue,2 2 the FLRA should examine the extent to which collective bar-
gaining over drug testing occurs in the private sector.23 This Recent
Development will address these issues, explore whether collective bar-
gaining is permissible, and describe what specific issues are subject to
bargaining.
B. Determination of Negotiable Issues
Unlike collective bargaining in the private sector, collective bargain-
ing in the public sector is fairly new and more restricted.24 Negotiable
issues between the government employer and employee cannot unduly
infringe upon management rights to control the agency's operations, 25
nor conflict with federal government rules and regulations.26 Yet,
(B) to assign work, to make determinations with respect to contracting out, and
to determine the personnel by which agency operations shall be conducted;
(C) with respect to filling positions, to make selections for appointments from-
(i) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion; or
(ii) any other appropriate source, and
(D) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the agency mission
during emergencies.
5 U.S.C. § 7106(a) (1982).
22. Opportunity to Comment, supra note 19.
23. Public employee bargaining is narrower than bargaining in the private sector.
See Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1680, 1682-
1700 (1984) (article presents an analytical contrast between private sector and public
sector bargaining). Private parties have a duty to bargain over mandatory subjects
which include "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment," National
Labor Relations Bd. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); see 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). If collective bargaining over drug-testing in the private sector is
minimal, then afortiori collective bargaining over drug-testing will be even less likely in
the public sector.
Unlike the Federal Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Act does not
specifically enumerate management rights. Refusal to bargain is an unfair labor prac-
tice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1982). The parties can choose to bargain over any
subject not considered mandatory. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349. Since no specific
codification of management rights exists, the Board and courts must analyze the case
law to discern mandatory, permissive, and exclusive management rights. Public sector
bargaining is to the contrary. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
24. See H. ROBINSON, NEGOTIABILITY IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR 1-8 (1981) (brief
review of public sector bargaining rights). Although management rights are impermis-
sible subjects for bargaining in the private sector, employers' rights are not codified. See
generally Developments, supra note 23 (classification of management rights in the pri-
vate sector) and supra note 21 (management rights in the public sector).
25. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 7117 (1982). Unions may bargain over proposals that are subject to a
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management rights are not absolute.27 Employees adversely affected2 8
by the exercise of management rights can negotiate over appropriate
arrangements to mitigate the harm.2 9 The FLRA approach for evalu-
ating a union proposal considers whether the proposal is appropriate or
an excessive interference with management rights. The agency exam-
ines the arrangement and, if appropriate, weighs benefits to employees
against management rights."a
1. Direct Interference Test
The FLRA adopted this new approach after the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia overruled the FLRA's previous
application of a "direct interference ' 3 1 test in American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 2782 v. FLRA. 2 In Local 2782, the
union proposed that the Bureau of the Census consider demoted em-
ployees for available vacancies in their previous positions.33 The
agency refused to bargain because the proposal was contrary to govern-
government rule or regulation if the FLRA finds no "compelling need" for the rule or
regulation. Id. See also 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2)(D) (1982).
27. Management rights are subject to the following negotiable issues:
(1) at the election of the agency, on the numbers, types, and grades of employees or
positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work project, or tour of
duty, or on the technology, methods, and means of performing work;
(2) procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exercising
any authority under this section; or
(3) appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any
authority under this section by such management officials.
5 U.S.C. § 7106(b) (1982).
28. Adverse impact refers to the effect on the employee of management's decision to
exercise its right of management authority. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Gov't Employ-
ees, Local R14-87 and Kansas Army National Guard, 21 F.L.R.A. 24, 33 (1986)
(FLRA noted that loss of one's job imposes a severe impact). See also Executive Order,
supra note 9 at 1190 (employee termination for continued use of drugs and refusal to
obtain drug counseling).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3) (1983). See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
30. 21 F.L.R.A. 24, 31-32 (1986). See infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
31 A union proposal that "directly interferes" with management rights is nonnego-
tiable Department of Defense v. FLRA, 659 F.2d 1140, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982). See infra note 34 and accompanying text (noting rejection
of the direct interference test).
32, 702 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
33. Id. at 1184. The affected employees were those demoted through a reduction-
in-force program. Id. Reduction-in-force establishes a priority order for a layoff sys-
tem See 5 U.S.C. § 3318 (1982) (Civil Service application of employee selection).
19881
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ment policy.34 The FLRA agreed, noting that the proposal conflicted
with management's right to fill positions from any appropriate
source.35 Upon review, the District of Columbia Circuit held that a
proposal advancing the interests of affected employees may be negotia-
ble although it interferes with management rights.36 The court, how-
ever, cautioned against excessive interference with management
rights,37 and held that appellate courts should give FLRA decisions
substantial weight.3 8
2. Excessive Interference Test
In National Association of Government Employees, Local R14-87 and
Kansas Army National Guard39 the FLRA set forth its "excessive in-
terference" test.4 ° The test first evaluates whether a proposal is an ap-
34. 702 F.2d at 1184. See also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2782
and Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 7 F.L.R.A. 91 (1981).
35. 702 F.2d at 1185. The FLRA stated the proposal conflicted with 5 U.S.C.
§ 7106(a)(2)(C), which gives management the right to select employees from any appro-
priate source. 702 F.2d at 1185. See also supra note 21.
36. Id. at 1188. The court rejected the direct interference test used by the FLRA
because it inadequately evaluated whether a proposal is appropriate, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3). The direct interference test originally evaluated proposals regard-
ing agency procedure, and determined whether the proposal was merely procedural, or
related to a substantive management decision. For these situations, the court noted, a
direct interference with management right test is appropriate. 702 F.2d at 1186.
The direct interference test inadequately evaluates whether a proposal is appropriate
because the test deprives the statute of its meaning. Id. The court noted: "It is difficult
to conceive of any 'appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected' which
(1) would be invalid unless exempted from subsection (a); (2) do not directly affect
management prerogatives; and (3) are not themselves procedures so that paragraph
(b)(3) would not entirely duplicate paragraph (b)(2))." Id. (emphasis in original). To
avoid depriving the statute of effect, the court recognized that a proposal can interfere
with management rights if its purpose is to aid adversely affected employees. The court
cited congressional debate indicating that Congress intended such a result. Id. at 1187-
1188 (citing 124 CONG. REC. 29,198-29,199, 38,715 (1978) (remarks of Reps. Udall and
Ford)).
37. 702 F.2d at 1188. The court refused to speculate as to which subjects would
constitute excessive interference. Id.
38. Id. The court, as in cases where NLRB rulings are challenged, will defer to the
administrative board results because of its experience and knowledge in the labor area.
Id. See also Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983)
(quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)); American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees, Local 1931 v. FLRA, 802 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1986).
39. 21 F.L.R.A. 24 (1986).
40. Id. at 31-33.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/11
DRUG TESTING OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
propriate arrangement intended to benefit adversely affected
employees.4" If the proposal intends to mitigate the adverse effects of
management rights on employees, the FLRA will determine whether
the proposal excessively interferes with management rights.4 2 The
FLRA makes this determination by weighing the benefits to the em-
ployees against the effects on management. The FLRA will consider:
the nature and extent of the proposal's impact on the employee;4 3 the
employee's ability to control adverse effects;' the type and amount of
management rights affected;4 5 the manner in which the proposal will
affect management rights;46 whether the balance of interests between
employees and management is disproportionate;47 and the effects of the
proposal on government operations.48 Despite this list of factors,4 9 the
FLRA noted that a decision will depend on each particular situation.5 °
Since Kansas Army National Guard, the FLRA issued several deci-
sions involving proposals for repromotions of demoted employees,
51
41. Id. at 31-32. In Local 2782, the union proposed that if the agency chose to fill
positions previously held by employees demoted through a reduction-in-force program,
the agency should select the most qualified demoted employee. The agency disputed the
directive to select the employee with the "highest retention standing" among competing
demoted employees. Id. at 27-28.
42. Id. at 31-33. "[A] union must articulate how employees will be detrimentally
affected by management's actions and how the matter proposed for bargaining is in-
tended to address or compensate for the actual or anticipated adverse effects of the
exercise of the management right or rights." Id. at 31. The FLRA will weigh "the
competing practical needs of employees and their managers." Id. at 31-32.
43. Id. at 32. "[TJhat is, what conditions of employment are affected and to what
degree?" Id.
44. Id. See also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees and Dep't of Commerce, Bu-
reau of the Census, 14 F.L.R.A. 801 (1984) (employees demoted without fault); Na-
tional Labor Relations Bd. Union and NLRB, Office of the General Counsel, 18
F.L.R.A. 320 (1985) (employees affected based on job performance).
45. 21 F.L.R.A. at 32.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 33. "Is the negative impact on management's rights disproportionate to
the benefits to be derived from the proposed arrangement?" Id.
48. Id. "What is the effect of the proposal on effective and efficient government
operations, that is, what are the benefits or burdens involved?" Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Proposals involving employees affected by a reduction in force program include:
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1450 and U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban
Dev., 23 F.L.R.A. 3 (1986); Department of the Air Force, Air Force Logistics Com-
mand Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 22
F.L.R.A. 15 (1986); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees and Dep't of the Army, Kansas
1988]
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training and retraining programs. 2 work performance standards, 5
3
uniform requirements,54 furloughs,55 disciplinary actions 6 and work
station relocations.57 Consistent with Local 2782, these decisions hold
that a union proposal is not excessive interference if it influences man-
agement decision-making,5" but fails to totally eliminate management's
authority59 to select an appropriate course of action. Imposing a drug
testing program in the federal sector implies that management has a
right to assure internal security. Thus, examination of other proposals
National Guard, 21 F.L.R.A. 905 (1986); National Treasury Employees and Dep't of
the Treasury, 21 F.L.R.A. 667 (1986); AFSCME, Local 2830 and Dep't of Justice, 21
F.L.R.A. 1039 (1986); Fed. Union of Scientists and Engineers and Dep't of the Navy,
Naval Underwater Systems, 22 F.L.R.A. 731 (1986); National Fed'n of Fed. Employ-
ees, Local 29 and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 21 F.L.R.A. 630 (1986); National
Ass'n of Gov't Employees, Local R14-87 and The Adjutant General of Kansas, 21
F.L.R.A. 313 (1986); American Fed.n of Gov't Employees and Dep't of Health and
Human Services, 21 F.L.R.A. 117 (1986).
52. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees and Dep't of the Army, Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland, 22 F.L.R.A. 574 (1986) (proposal to select volunteers for a
training program); American Fed'n of Gov't and Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 21
F.L.R.A. 354 (1986) (proposal to perform a cost study of a furlough retraining program
instead of an immediate reduction in force program).
53. See Department of the Air Force, Air Force Logistics Command Wright-Patter-
son Air Force Base and Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 21 F.L.R.A. 609 (1986) (job
performance appraisal methods); American Fed'n of Employees Local 1923 and Dep't
of Health and Human Services, 21 F.L.R.A. 178 (1986) (proposal affecting employees
who fail to improve job performance).
54. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 217 and Veterans Admin. Med-
ical Center, Augusta, Georgia, 21 F.L.R.A. 62 (1986) (proposal for type of uniforms
worn is negotiable).
55. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 32 and Office of Personnel
Management, 22 F.L.R.A. 307 (1986) (request that employee furloughs be continuous
to enable employees to qualify for unemployment).
56. See National Fed'n of Employees and U.S. Dep't of the Interior, U.S. Geologi-
cal Survey Eastern Mapping Agency, 21 F.L.R.A. 1105 (1986) (effective date of discipli-
nary action).
57. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 3231 and Social Security Ad-
min., 22 F.L.R.A. 868 (1986) (proposal for job training if relocated); Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union and Internal Revenue Service, 22 F.L.R.A. 314 (1986) (change in
employee working conditions); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 644 and U.S.
Dep't of Labor, 21 F.L.R.A. 658 (1986) (relocation of library is nonnegotiable).
58. See supra notes 51-57.
59. The proposal must avoid forcing management to undertake a certain course of
action, or eliminate a management decision. See supra notes 51-57. Cf Local 2782,
supra note 37 (court's analysis of the F.L.R.A. legislative history and conclusion that
Congress allowed unions to negotiate over more than just mere procedures on behalf of
adversely affected employees).
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that also affect internal security measures may provide guidelines appli-
cable to drug testing issues.
C. Drug Testing as Protection of Internal Security
In American Federation of Government Employees, Local 644 and
U.S. Department of Labor,"° the FLRA held that a union proposal for
relocation of a library excessively interfered with management rights
and thus was nonnegotiable.6 The FLRA noted that the benefits to
employees of larger office space did not outweigh the agency's security
interest in selecting the library location.62
The FLRA also found excessive interference with internal security
measures in National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 153 and De-
partment of the Treasury.63 The FLRA struck down the union's pro-
posal to eliminate agency investigation or documentation of public
reports concerning non-criminal conduct by United States Customs
employees.' The agency sought to implement a public hotline for re-
ports of suspected criminal conduct by Customs employees. 65 The
FLRA concluded that although the union's proposal would benefit em-
ployees engaged in noncriminal conduct, 66 the proposal failed to out-
weigh management's right to protect internal security and
unauthorized disclosures because agency investigation of non-criminal
60. 21 F.L.R.A. 658 (1986).
61. Id. at 661-62. Among other union proposals under review, the FLRA consid-
ered a proposal to relocate a library/conference room and utilize the space for offices.
The agency alleged that the proposal conflicted with management's right to "determine
the technology, methods and means of performing its work [5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1)
(1982)] and under section 7106(a)(1) to determine its internal security practices." 21
F.L.R.A. at 661.
62. Id. at 662. The F.L.R.A. weighed the benefit to the employees of more office
space against the agency's objective of controlling theft and maintaining security, con-
cluding that the employee's benefit did not outweigh the security objective. Id.
63. 21 F.L.R.A. 841 (1986).
64. Id. at 841-42. The agency engaged in "impact bargaining" with the union over
an agency proposal to establish a hotline for the public to report criminal activity of
customs employees. The union proposed that the agency not document non-criminal
matters reported; that a press release advising the public of the hotline mention the
aforementioned proposal; and the agency advise the union of non-criminal matters re-
ported. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 845. The court noted that employees would be subject to disciplinary
actions. Id.
1988]
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conduct might lead to a discovery of criminal conduct.67 Also, the
proposal would not promote effective and efficient government
operations.68
Drug testing appears more controversial and important than library
location 69 and equally as serious as criminal activity.70 Since employ-
ees involved in drug testing may face possible disciplinary actions, pro-
posals to assure the least harmful effects of a drug testing program will
be beneficial. Yet, government agencies have a significant interest in
preventing dissemination of unauthorized classified information held
by security-sensitive employees and protecting their own property and
employees. Perhaps the effects of drug testing on negotiability in the
private sector may provide an impetus for drug testing negotiation in
the public sector.71
D. Drug Testing and Negotiability in the Private Sector
1. The Railroad Cases
The FLRA is interested in whether drug testing is negotiable in the
private sector.72 Two courts addressed whether drug testing can be
unilaterally imposed prior to private sector bargaining.73 The cases in-
volved the Railway Labor Act (RLA)74 and the railroad industry's
Rule 6," prohibiting on-duty use or possession of drugs or alcohol, or
67. Id. The particular conduct concerns the agency's "enforcement of customs laws
and other related laws against the smuggling of contraband; for the assessment, collec-
tion and protection of revenue by levying import duties and taxes; and for the control of
carriers, persons and articles entering or departing the United States." Id. at 844.
68. Id. at 845.
69. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 19, 22-23 and accompanying text.
72. Id.
73. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
74. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164, 181-188 (1981).
75. Rule 6 provides as follows:
The use of alcoholic beverages, intoxicants and narcotics, marijuana, or other con-
trolled substances by employees subject to duty, or their possession or use while on
duty, or on Company property is prohibited. Employees must not report for duty
under the influence of any alcoholic beverage, intoxicant, narcotic, marijuana, or
other controlled substance or medication, including those prescribed by a Doctor,
that may in any way adversely affect their alertness, coordination, reaction, re-
sponse or safety.
Excerpted in Brotherhood of Maintenance Way Employees v. Burlington Northern
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reporting to work under the adverse effects of drugs or alcohol.7 6
The Railway Labor Act and subsequent judicial interpretations77
distinguish between minor7 8 and major 79 labor disputes.8" Minor dis-
putes involve labor conflicts arising from a condition in the collective
bargaining agreement or involving past practices, while major disputes
involve conditions not previously agreed upon or contemplated by the
parties.81 To promote the free flow of commerce, the RLA requires
dispute settlement rather than immediate employee strikes.82 The em-
ployer may implement only minor changes in working conditions prior
to negotiations.83 Major changes in working conditions require bar-
gaining prior to implementation.8 4
In Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Burlington
Northern R.R. Co.85 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that post-incident and post-furlough drug testing are mi-
R.R. Co., 802 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1986). See infra note 85 and accompanying
text.
76. See infra notes 90 and 95 and accompanying text.
77. See Elgin, Joliet & Eastern R.R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945) (defining
major and minor disputes); Switchmen's Union of North Am. v. Southern Pacific Co.,
398 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1968) (court taking a different approach to defining major and
minor disputes focusing on "arguably justified" terms embodied in the collective bar-
gaining agreement). See also Cases Noted, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 992 (1946); Recent
Cases, 59 HARV. L. REv. 992 (1946); Comments on Recent Cases, 31 IA. L. REV. 436
(1946) (all comment on Elgin).
78. 45 U.S.C. § 151a (4) (1982). See Elgin, 325 U.S. at 722-723 (major disputes
involve negotiation of collective bargaining agreements). The court in Elgin stated,
"They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed
to have vested in the past." Id. at 723.
79. 45 U.S.C. § 151a (5) (1982). Compare Elgin, 325 U.S. at 722-723 (minor dis-
putes involve grievances arising out of preexisting terms in a labor contract).
80. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. For elaboration of the Railway
Labor Act, see Cox, BOK, GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW, 79-87
(1986); GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, 718 (1976); Ingle, Railway Labor Leg-
islation, 18 TENN. L. REV. 359 (1944).
81. Elgin, 325 U.S. at 722-728. See also infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text
(discussion of Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington
Northern R.R. Co., 802 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1986), and its application of Elgin).
82. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982) (affirmative duty to reach peaceful settlements on em-
ployers and employees).
83. Brotherhood of Maintenance Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington North-
ern R.R. Co., 802 F.2d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 1986).
84. Id.
85. 802 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1986).
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nor disputes; 6 thus, the railroad company could unilaterally impose
testing prior to bargaining. The railroad company imposed drug test-
ing87 on employees involved in human-error accidents and on employ-
ees returning from furlough. 88 Post incident testing was "minor"
because the railroad company and the union previously engaged in a
practice of investigating suspected drug use.89 Post-furlough testing is
a modem application of the railroad company's past practice of requir-
ing physical examinations.9° Similarly, in Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co.,9 the court held that a rail-
road company's drug testing program,92 arguably justified93 by the col-
86. Id. at 1023. The court divided the opinion into two major issues. The majority
opinion concentrates on the court's holding regarding post-incident testing. The con-
curring opinion states the court's position on post-furlough testing. Id. at 1017. Judge
Arnold, dissenting from the majority opinion on post-furlough testing, acknowledged
post-furlough medical examinations, including blood and urine testing, as a past com-
pany practice, but viewed the additional "drug screen" as a new procedure requiring
bargaining before implementation by the railroad company. Id. at 1024-1025. Judge
Arnold argued that the drug screen was not based on reasonable cause. Id. In addition,
Judge Arnold did not believe the program assured employees of confidentiality. Id.
87. Drug testing detects the use of alcohol or drugs. Id. at 1017.
88. Id. Both tests were mandatory. Id. Prior to implementation of these tests, the
railroad company required drug tests only upon finding probable cause for suspected
drug use. Id. at 1018. The railroad company defined probable cause as "outward mani-
festation of intoxication." Id. See also supra note 75 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the railroad industry's Rule 6).
89. Burlington, 802 F.2d at 1023. In addition to testing for probable cause, the
company required testing after an "accident, an on-the-job injury, a rule violation, or an
unsafe act." Id. at 1019. See also supra note 88 (railroad company requires probable
cause for drug testing). The court analyzed this issue utilizing the major/minor dispute
presented in Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945). See supra notes
78-85 and accompanying text. The court mentioned that the union did not object to
previous testing, and this additional test represented "a more refined step, the urine test,
to confirm the observation of the supervisor." Burlington, 802 F.2d at 1023. The court
relied heavily on the fact that supervisors can test only an impaired employee. Id.
90. Burlington, 802 F.2d at 1024. Judge Fagg's concurrence emphasized the
union's acceptance of Burlington's requirement of post-furlough medical exams for
safety purposes. Id. The additional drug test also served the railroad company's pur-
pose "to ensure all BN employees are fit for duty." Id. Thus, in the court's opinion, the
rules have not substantially changed. Id. at 1023-1024.
91. 620 F. Supp. 173 (D. Mont. 1985), appealpending, No. 85-4138 (9th Cir. argued
July 8, 1986).
92. 620 F. Supp. at 175. The railroad company implemented 'drug testing to dis-
courage on-the-job use of intoxicating substances. Id. at 174. In a companion case, the
court held that the railroad company could not unilaterally implement a program utiliz-
ing dogs for the purpose of detecting drugs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs. v.
Burlington R.R. Co., 620 F. Supp. 163, 166, 173 (D. Mont. 1985). The court held that
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lective bargaining agreement, was not a major dispute.9 4
The analysis under the RLA as applied to the public sector is not
decisive for two reasons. First, the RLA evaluates considerations that
fail to address management rights.95 Instead of distinguishing between
major and minor disputes, public sector labor relations focuses on
management rights. 96 Second, and more importantly, the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Brotherhood of Maintenance specifically rejected the railroad's
argument that drug testing was nonnegotiable.97 The issue of whether
drug testing is negotiable, however, is still open.
2. The Utility Industry
Although the utility industry is also concerned with safety, courts
are unwilling to allow unilateral implementation of drug testing. In
IBEW v. Metropolitan Edison Co.," the court ordered an injunction
against an employer-imposed drug testing program99 at the Three Mile
Island nuclear power plant, pending the results of an arbitration."°°
such a procedure is a major dispute, realizing the severe impact that canine surveillance
would have on employer-employee relations. Id. at 173.
93. The court referred to its analysis in the canine surveillance case for the appro-
priate method of determining whether an implied contract condition involved a major
or minor dispute. Id. at 175. The implied contract condition was adherence to com-
pany Rule G prohibiting use of intoxicants. Id. The court used the following test: "Is
the position of at least one of the parties arguably predicated on the terms of an agree-
ment?" Id. (emphasis in original). If so, the dispute is minor, and employers can unilat-
erally implement a change in working condition, subject to later negotiation. Id. at 171.
See also Switchmen's Union of North America v. Southern Pac. Co., 398 F.2d 443 (9th
Cir. 1968) (relied on by court in Burlington to support use of arguably justified test).
94 620 F. Supp. at 175. The court noted that drug testing is not as offensive as the
canine surveillance in Burlington's companion case and was arguably justified by the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
95. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
97, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Northern R.R. Co., 802
F.2d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 1986).
98 Slip op. No. 86-4426 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1986).
99 Id. Metropolitan Edison sought to implement a drug and alcohol testing pro-
gram which would require testing in the following circumstances: reasonable suspicion
of drug use, during regular physical examinations, after rehabilitation for drug use, and
random. Id.
100. Id. The union was unable to resolve the drug testing issue. Despite scheduling
the dispute for arbitration, Metropolitan Edison chose to unilaterally implement drug
testing. Id.
The court recognized that it could not order preliminary injunctions in labor dis-
putes, unless the dispute was arbitrable. Id. (citing Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
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The arbitrator then prohibited Metropolitan Edison from imposing a
drug testing program without bargaining.1 °1 The union persuaded the
arbitrator by emphasizing the significant infringement upon employee
privacy interests, notwithstanding possible dangers from on-the-job
drug use at nuclear plants.102
3. Professional Sports
Highly publicized disputes over drug testing occur in the field of pro-
fessional sports. 0 3 Baseball management and players are currently in-
volved in mediation over mandatory drug testing." 4 Recently, an
arbitrator prohibited the National Football League (NFL) from impos-
ing random drug testing without bargaining.l°5 The collective bargain-
ing agreement allowed drug testing in pre-season physicals, 10 6 and,
among other changes to the drug testing program,10 7 Commissioner
Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1979)). The court concluded that the underlying dis-
pute was arbitrable and, utilizing the Third Circuit's analysis for preliminary injunc-
tions, concluded that arbitration would not be futile. The court held that the labor
union's interests outweighed the interests of Metropolitan Edison and the public in the
safe operation of a nuclear power plant. See supra note 98, IBEW, slip op. at 5. See also
Nursing Home & Hospital Union No. 434 v. Sky Vue Terrace, Inc., 759 F.2d 1094 (3d
Cir. 1985) (Third Circuit test for preliminary injunction in labor cases). The court
noted that Metropolitan Edison already maintained a drug testing program, and em-
ployees subject to the new program could be irreparably harmed. Id.
101. Arbitration Panel Bars Random Drug Tests At Three Mile Island Nuclear
Power Plant, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 199, at A-5 (Oct. 15, 1986). The arbitrator
concluded that the collective bargaining agreement did not permit unilateral imposition
of a drug testing program. Id.
102. Id. "'Manifestly all of us have an interest in eliminating drugs and alcohol in
the work place, but I believe such an invasion of the privacy of the innocent in order to
discover the guilty establishes. . . [a] dangerous. . . precedent.'" Id. See also Mur-
ray v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2057 (1986) (court also ordered
injunction pending arbitration between the employer and the union regarding the em-
ployer's drug testing program).
103. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
104. Tom Roberts, Baseball's Impartial Arbitrator, Holds Hearing Into Grievance
Filed By Baseball Players Association, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1986, at B14, col. 2.
105. In re Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n and Nat'l Football League Manage-
ment Council and the Nat'l Football League, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 209 at D-1
(Oct. 29, 1986).
106. Id. AD-3 - D-4, Article XXXI, Section 5, 6, and 7 of the 1982 collective
bargaining agreement documents the parties' current drug testing program. Id. In ad-
dition to pre-season physicals, the parties jointly agreed on a facility to conduct educa-
tional testing and treatment, and a confidentiality clause. Id.
107. Id. at D-5. Alvin "Pete" Rozelle is Commissioner of the National Football
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Rozelle °8 sought to unilaterally impose additional unscheduled
tests. o9 The arbitrator addressed the issue of whether the drug testing
provision in the League's 1982 collective bargaining agreement con-
flicted with Rozelle's drug testing program." 0 Resolution of this issue
was necessary to determine whether management could unilaterally ex-
ercise rights to protect the integrity of the game by implementing drug
testing. ' "
The arbitrator found that the parties negotiated and codified drug
testing procedures"2 in the 1982 agreement. While leaving much of
Rozelle's plan intact," 3 the arbitrator found that the unscheduled drug
League. Id. at D-1. Rozelle selected Dr. Forest S. Tenant to supervise the drug testing
program and Smith-Kline Laboratories to perform testing and increased the penalties
for violation of confidentiality. Id. The National Football League Player's Association
(NFLPA) opposed these moves because they violated terms of the current collective
bargaining agreement; the NFLPA asserted that Rozelle lacked authority to impose any
program once the parties had negotiated the subject matter. Id. at D-5 - D-6. See
supra note 106 and accompanying text.
108. Among the Commissioner's responsibilities are dispute resolution between the
players and the League, establishing policy and procedures necessary to maintain the
integrity of League and implementing disciplinary actions when necessary. Id. at D-2
(citing Article VIII of the 1985 N.F.L. Constitution and By-Laws).
109. Id. at D-5. Rozelle's drug program required two unscheduled drug tests dur-
ing the season. Id.
110. Id. at D-10. The Management Council argued that the Commissioner had
plenary authority to maintain discipline to protect the integrity of the game, and that
therefore NFLPA is the party altering the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at D-8.
The NFL asserted Rozelle's management rights to implement a more effective program
when the management and the NFLPA fail to take appropriate action. Id. at D-7. In
addition to past practice of the Commissioner, "[t]he NFL further point[ed] out that
Commissioner Rozelle was deeply concerned about the career-ending and life-threaten-
ing potential of drug use, as well as the erosion of public confidence in the game itself,
with consequent harm to the interests of both players and clubs." Id.
111. Id. at D-14. The arbitrator concluded that the Commissioner's powers were
not plenary. The collective bargaining agreement allowed individual clubs to have rules
and regulations that were not contrary to NFL rules, and the Commissioner's role was
similar to an employer. Id. at D-13. Thus, the arbitrator stated that the collective
bargaining agreement limited the Commissioner's rulemaking authority. Id.
112. Id. at D-13.
113. Id. at D-15. The arbitrator recognized that the Commissioner could exercise
some authority. Id. at D-14. "The parties bargained about a chemical dependency pro-
gram, testing and confidentiality. Interestingly, they did not include in their bargain
subjects such as 'prohibited substances,' 'amphetamines,' 'anabolic steroids;' the specif-
ics of after care for players who test positive for drugs; the status of players hospitalized
for drug treatment and/or their entitlement to pay or the extent to which, if any, play-
ers would be disciplined for improper drug involvement." Id. The arbitrator upheld
the Commissioner's right to appoint Dr. Forest S. Tenant as Drug Advisor and Smith-
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test conflicted with the collective bargaining agreement.' 14 Since the
parties agreed on appropriate occasions for drug testing,1" the Com-
missioner could not unilaterally implement any changes to that
agreement. 116
The NFL arbitration indicates the desirability of negotiation over
drug testing. Management must be able to freely function in its du-
ties. 17 Furthermore, labor-management disputes should be resolved in
a peaceful manner. 8 Moreover, privacy interests are important and
may even outweigh safety concerns if an immediate resolution to a la-
bor dispute is possible. 9 Finally, management should refrain from
altering existing collective bargaining terms because the parties' mutual
agreement supercedes management rights. 120
E. Conclusion
Application of the aforementioned themes to the federal public sec-
tor clashes with a literal reading of applicable statutes.' 21 Physical
safety and well-being are significant interests, but national security may
pose a greater threat to the American public. This threat certainly sup-
ports federal managers in their efforts to establish effective internal se-
curity procedures. These procedures, however, will erode labor
relations,1 22 and contravene congressional intent for amicable labor re-
lations. When weighing and balancing the interests of employers and
employees, the FLRA should consider the unique circumstances of this
infringement and the potential harm to employees.
Drug testing is controversial and federal employers should carefully
Kline Laboratories, testing of draft-eligible players, designation of specific prohibited
drugs and confidentiality requirements. Id. at D-15 - D-16.
114. Id. at D-15. "'[]nscheduled testing' is not addressed, contemplated or per-
mitted by Article XXXI of the collective bargaining agreement." Id. The arbitrator
commented that the NFLPA resisted attempts to implement drug testing, but later
agreed only to the terms in the present collective bargaining agreement. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. The arbitrator considered that the negotiators did not contemplate un-
scheduled drug testing when negotiating the 1982 collective bargaining agreement. Id.
117. See supra notes 24-51 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 103-116 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 21 and 27 and accompanying text.
122. See Wollett, The Bargaining Process in the Public Sector: What is Bargain-
able?, 51 OR. L. RaV. 177, 182 (1971).
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evaluate any program prior to implementation. The arbitrator in
Metropolitan Edison commented that employers are over-anxious to
implement such programs. 123 Parties should thus be afforded the op-
portunity to reasonably negotiate a mutual drug testing agreement. 124
Constance M. Borek*
123. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
124 Id.
* J.D. 1987, Washington University.
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